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Abstract 
This study examined the uncertain responses of 56 5- to 17-year-old alleged sexual abuse 
victims testifying in Scottish criminal court trials. Don’t know/remember ground rules were 
explained to 38% of the children and each child reported uncertainty in response to 15% of 
the questions on average. Uncertain responding was associated with expressions of resistance 
and confusion, questioning context (proportionally more regarding substantive than non-
substantive issues), question content (least to disclosure-focused questions), utterance type 
(more to directives, particularly those posed by defense lawyers; more to recall-based than 
recognition prompts), and age (children in mid-adolescence were less likely to respond 
uncertainly than those who were either older or younger). There were no associations 
between expressions of uncertainty and ground rule administration, or with whether or not 
the question focused on central rather than peripheral details about the alleged crimes. 
Findings highlight concerns surrounding preparatory procedures to help witnesses, especially 
adolescents, indicate uncertainty when testifying. 
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Children's Uncertain Responses When Testifying about Alleged Sexual Abuse in Scottish 
Courts 
In criminal court, the reliability and completeness of children’s accounts is critical, 
especially in cases addressing child sexual abuse because witness testimony is often the 
primary source of evidence, and children’s evidence can have a large impact on legal 
outcomes. It is important to examine the frequency and conditions under which children 
express uncertainty in court, since allowing children to express uncertainty increases the 
likelihood that the information elicited from them is truthful and accurate (Koriat, Goldsmith, 
Schneider, & Nakash-Dura, 2001; Roebers & Schneider, 2005). 
Furthermore, courtroom questioning can be unusual and difficult for children, who are 
accustomed to being tested by knowledgeable adults (Lyon, 2010), and often feel pressured 
to answer adults’ questions (Earhart, La Rooy, Brubacher, & Lamb, 2014). Lawyers may also 
question children using complicated prompts about events that occurred long ago (Andrews, 
Lamb, & Lyon, 2015; Hanna, Davies, Crothers, & Henderson, 2012; Spencer & Lamb, 
2012), making it critical to prepare children for their unique roles as witnesses by instructing 
them not to guess and to express uncertainty when they do not know the answers to questions 
(i.e., the “don’t know” ground rule).  
Comparing children’s propensity to express uncertainty in response to prosecutors 
and defense lawyers may be particularly important because lawyers are motivated to 
undermine the opponents’ witnesses and question alleged victims of child sex abuse 
accordingly, by asking easier or more difficult questions, respectively (Andrews et al., 2015). 
Remarkably, however, very little field research has been conducted on children’s uncertain 
responses, and there has been no prior research on children’s uncertain responses in criminal 
court proceedings.  
What Aspects of Courtroom Questioning Might Increase the Likelihood that Children 
Will Express Uncertainty? 
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The likelihood that child witnesses might experience uncertainty in court relative to 
other forensic contexts is greater because courtroom questioning is often insensitive and 
cognitively unsupportive. This may be because lawyers are trained to elicit specific responses 
from children, with defense lawyers -- in particular -- trained to discredit witnesses (which 
they do by asking difficult-to-answer questions). For example, a host of studies (see Lamb, 
Malloy, Hershkowitz, & La Rooy, 2015; Walker, Kenniston, & Inada, 2013) have revealed 
that many questions put to witnesses are linguistically complicated, include advanced 
vocabulary, and/or may require witnesses to report on information outside the scope of their 
competency (e.g., recall event dates and frequencies). Moreover, lawyers often ask child 
witnesses about events that occurred long ago (often years ago) and may ask children to 
recollect aspects of the past event that may be especially difficult to recall (e.g., peripheral 
details about what clothing was worn on a certain day).  
Further, although forensic interviewers are routinely advised to tell children that they 
should say “I don’t know” and “I don’t understand” when appropriate (Lamb, Orbach, 
Hershkowitz, Esplin, & Horowitz, 2007), it is unclear whether similar advice is offered in 
court, where it might be especially important because of the intimidating setting and the 
complexity of the questions asked, often by lawyers who are not trained to question children. 
In court, children also promise to tell the truth, making it especially important that they are 
encouraged to admit uncertainty when appropriate.  
Because lawyers ask many suggestive and closed-ended option-posing questions in 
court (Andrews et al., 2015) which pull for specific answers, the pressure to respond may be 
further increased (Warren, Hulse-Trotter, & Tubbs, 1991). For example, the extent to which 
questions offer options from which children can select (e.g., “yes/no”) may make guessing 
easier than expressing uncertainty. The closed-ended and leading nature of lawyers’ 
questions also makes it unlikely that children are routinely given the opportunity to explain 
why they are uncertain.  
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In sum, a number of factors may affect the propensity for children to express 
uncertainty more often in court than in other forensic contexts, including lawyer role 
(prosecutors vs. defense lawyers), whether or not the questions focused on central details 
about the alleged crime, the content of the questions posed (e.g., questions about actions 
during the alleged event vs. questions about the exact time of the incident), and the leading 
and closed-ended questions that lawyers routinely use when questioning children.  
Experimental Research on Children’s Uncertain Responses 
The conditions under which children accurately express uncertainty in response to 
adults’ questions have been widely researched in experimental and analogue studies. Such 
studies have found that children often feel obligated to answer adults’ questions, and that 
children attempt to answer nonsensical or unanswerable questions, rather than express 
uncertainty, even when they lack the required information or the questions do not make sense 
(Hughes & Grieve, 1980; Pratt, 1990; Waterman, Blades, & Spencer, 2000, 2001).  
Waterman et al. (2000) found that 92-96% of the children who answered nonsensical 
questions knew that the questions were ‘silly’ and unanswerable, but guessed anyway. 
Furthermore, children attempted to answer rather than express uncertainty more often when 
the nonsensical or unanswerable questions were closed-ended yes/no recognition prompts 
than when they were more recall-based (Gee, Gregory, & Pipe, 1999; Waterman et al., 2000; 
Waterman, Blades, & Spencer, 2004). Waterman and colleagues (2004) found that 8-year-
olds were more likely to provide correct responses than 6-year-olds, and were thus more 
likely to express uncertainty when appropriate. Worryingly, when forced to guess in response 
to misleading questions, both adults and children tended to aver the incorrect information in 
subsequent interviews (Gombos, Pezdek, & Haymond, 2012; Stolzenberg & Pezdek, 2013).  
However, experimental studies have also shown that pre-interview instructions 
encouraging children to say “I don’t know” when they did not know, lead them to say “I 
don’t know” appropriately more often but the instruction did not affect responses to non-
misleading questions (Mulder & Vrij, 1996; Waterman & Blades, 2011). This was 
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particularly true when children practiced using the “don’t know” ground rule prior to 
substantive questioning (Danby, Brubacher, Sharman, & Powell, 2015). Such findings have 
informed recommendations that forensic interviewers should explicitly encourage children to 
say ‘I don’t know/remember’ when appropriate (Lamb et al., 2007). 
Field Research on Children’s Uncertain Responses 
Unlike experimental settings, forensic contexts often involve children being 
questioned about personally significant and emotionally salient events. As a result, children 
may express uncertainty, not because they genuinely do not know or remember the answer, 
but more often because they are reluctant to respond to the question, either because they find 
the subject matter difficult to talk about, or because they want to omit details. This possibility 
has affected the way that uncertainty has been coded in previous field research. 
Most studies examining reluctance in child investigative interviews have measured 
children’s reluctance by calculating how often children (whose abuse had been verified 
independently) denied abuse, resisted answering questions, or omitted information (e.g., 
Ahern, Hershkowitz, Lamb, Blasbalg, & Winstanley, 2014; Hershkowitz, 2013; Hershkowitz, 
Lamb, Katz, & Malloy, 2015; Hershkowitz, Orbach, Lamb, Sternberg, & Horowitz, 2006; 
Hershkowitz, Orbach, Sternberg, Pipe, Lamb, & Horowitz, 2007). In all such studies 
omissions were the most common type of reluctant utterances; these included various 
uncertain responses (e.g., don’t know/don’t remember, non-responses/silence).  
In a study looking at the effects of enhanced rapport-building in forensic interviews 
with 4- to 13-year-olds alleging sexual abuse, omissions constituted a substantial minority of 
responses, including 18% of all responses in the rapport-building and 12% in the substantive 
(abuse-related) contexts of the interviews (Hershkowitz et al., 2015). Children who did not 
disclose abuse that had been independently corroborated expressed more reluctance 
(including omissions) than children who did disclose (Hershkowitz et al., 2006, 2007). 
Furthermore, enhanced interviewer supportiveness and rapport-building resulted in markedly 
lower levels of reluctance, particularly omissions (Ahern et al., 2014; Hershkowitz et al., 
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2015). These studies suggested that it may sometimes be reasonable to view uncertain 
responses as indices of reluctance on the part of children motivated not to disclose their 
experiences.  
Unlike Hershkowitz and colleagues, who were concerned primarily with the dynamics 
of interviews with children who were reluctant to disclose abuse (Ahern et al., 2014; 
Hershkowitz, 2013; Hershkowitz et al., 2006, 2007, 2015), other researchers have evaluated 
children’s “don’t know” responses differently in investigative interviews. Earhart et al. 
(2014) examined 76 forensic interviews with allegedly abused 4- to 13- year-olds and found 
that, even though the “don’t know” ground rule was presented in 94% of the interviews, an 
average of only 7 “don’t know” responses were identified in each interview, constituting only 
6% of children’s substantive responses – half the proportion reported by Hershkowitz et al. 
(2015). This discrepancy may be attributable to differences in interview procedure as well as 
the inclusion of non-responses along with don’t know/remember responses in the ‘omissions’ 
category (Hershkowitz et al., 2015).  
As in experimental studies (Gee et al., 1999; Waterman et al., 2000, 2004), Earhart 
and colleagues found that directives were more likely than option-posing prompts to elicit 
don’t know responses. Earhart et al. (2014) found no association between age and the 
frequency of don’t know responses, how uncertainty was elicited (by the child, by the 
interviewer, or due to question type), and the effect of the ground rule on children’s 
propensity to express uncertainty. However, children aged 7 to 13 years were more likely 
than children aged 3 to 6 years to elaborate on their uncertain response and explain why they 
were uncertain. 
Lastly, Earhart et al. (2014) also attempted to ascertain whether some don’t know 
responses might reflect reluctance by measuring the number of details children provided 
during their interviews. They found no evidence that children who said “I don’t know” more 
often were any less informative overall. The inconsistent findings suggest that it may not be 
appropriate in field research, where baseline accuracy cannot be established, to view 
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uncertain responses as necessary indicators of reluctance, and highlight the need for further 
investigation into the extent to which children respond with uncertainty, why they do so, and 
how such responses are elicited. As noted earlier, there has been no previous research on 
expressions of uncertainty in the courtroom.  
Present Study 
It is crucial to study children’s uncertain responses in the course of trials, during 
which they are questioned by prosecutors who are motivated to enhance the credibility of 
their testimony, and by defense lawyers who are motivated to undermine it. Because 
children’s courtroom testimony is kept confidential by British courts and is not routinely 
transcribed, the current research builds upon a carefully negotiated and unprecedented 
collaboration with the Scottish judiciary, which has recently expressed considerable concern 
about the risks associated with the quality and testing of children’s testimony (e.g., Evidence 
and Procedure Review Report, Scottish Court Service, March, 2015).  
The present study was the first to investigate children’s uncertain responses in court 
by examining a sample of Scottish criminal trial transcripts involving 56 children aged 
between 5 and 17 years testifying about sexual abuse. Due to the absence of previous relevant 
research, the present study was largely descriptive in nature. We identified the presence or 
absence of the “don’t know” ground rule and assessed the effect it had on the frequency with 
which children expressed uncertainty in a variety of ways. We also investigated associations 
between uncertain responses and children’s age, which of the lawyers was involved, question 
type, question content, the centrality of the details sought, and reluctance (as indexed by 
children’s verbal productivity and overt expressions of emotion or confusion). We further 
differentiated among different types of uncertain responses and coded the reasons offered by 
children to explain their responses.  
We predicted that: 1) children would express more uncertainty when questioned using 
recall-based questions rather than recognition and suggestive prompts, 2) children would 
express more uncertainty when questioned by prosecutors than defense lawyers, due to 
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differences in their motivations and questioning techniques, and 3) children would express 
more uncertainty in response to questions about peripheral information than central 
information, because peripheral details are harder for children to remember (e.g., Peterson & 
Whalen, 2001). We did not make any predictions regarding age because previous research 
has yielded inconsistent findings.  
Method 
Sample 
With the approval and support of the Lord President, the Court Service Team of the 
Scottish Court Service identified cases conducted in six major court houses in Scotland 
between 2009 and 2014 in which alleged child victims of sexual abuse had testified. 
Recordings of the cases were then located, and the portions of the trials in which the children 
testified were transcribed. Transcripts of 36 trials involving a total of 56 alleged victims of 
child sexual abuse were included in the study. Nine cases (11 children) were from Aberdeen, 
9 cases (19 children) from Edinburgh, 12 cases (16 children) from Glasgow, 1 case (1 child) 
from Inverness, 3 cases (5 children) from Livingston, and 2 cases (4 children) from Perth.  
The trials included involved at least 25 different prosecutors, 24 defense attorneys, and 22 
judges. Identifying information was unavailable for nine transcripts.   
Children reported single (n = 18) or multiple (n = 38) sexually abusive experiences 
involving penetration (n = 38), touching under clothes (n = 10), touching over clothes (n = 3) 
and indecent exposure (n = 5). The final sample included 40 girls and 16 boys who were 5 to 
17 years of age (M = 13.99, SD = 2.69). Age could not be entered into parametric tests as a 
continuous variable because the distribution was not normal, D(55) = .20, p < .001. 
Therefore, children were categorized into three age groups at the time of trial: 12-year-olds 
and under (n = 15, M = 10.25, SD = 2.13), 13- to 15-year-olds (n = 26, M = 14.62, SD = .83), 
and 16- and 17-year-olds (n = 15, M = 16.57, SD = .52). These age categories were chosen 
because they accord with the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act (2009); 16 years is the age of 
sexual consent, but a person aged 16 or over can claim to be innocent of committing a sexual 
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offence with a child aged between 13 and 16 years if that person ‘reasonably believed’ that 
the child was over the age of 16. However, this reasonable belief provision does not apply if 
the offence involved a child under the age of 13. The children’s socioeconomic and ethnic 
backgrounds were unknown.  
All defendants were male. In 95% (n = 53) of the cases, the children knew the alleged 
abusers. The suspects were biological parents (n = 8), step-fathers/mothers’ boyfriends (n = 
3), other family members (n = 20), family friends (n = 5), friends/acquaintances (n = 17) and 
strangers (n = 3). Defendants were either convicted (n = 42) or acquitted (n = 10). The 
remaining 4 defendants were convicted but not for all alleged sexual offences.   
In accordance with the Victims and Witnesses [Scotland] Act (2014), many of the 
children had special measures in place. All courts were closed to the public. Four children 
received no other special measures. Other children gave evidence in court with a screen and a 
support person present (n = 15), or just a support person present (n = 5). The remaining 
children gave evidence via a live TV link with a support person present (n = 21) or without a 
support person present (n = 3), or their evidence was taken on commission
1
 (n = 8).  
Coding of Transcripts 
The transcripts contained direct- and often redirect-examinations, in which the 
prosecution questioned the children, and cross-examinations, in which the defense questioned 
the children. No transcripts contained recross-examinations. Both the substantive and non-
substantive questions and responses were coded.  
Context: Non-substantive. Lawyers’ statements or questions that were not focused 
on the incident under investigation were coded as non-substantive. These included 1) 
procedural prompts, defined as comments, statements, or questions concerning procedural 
aspects of the direct/cross examinations, including introductory information and instructions, 
                                                     
1
 Taking evidence by a commissioner is considered only for the most vulnerable witnesses. In 
these instances, delays in testifying may increase distress and trauma, significantly hindering 
the witness’s ability to give evidence. Evidence can therefore be taken before a commissioner 
appointed by the court. The evidence is taken in full (direct-, cross-, and re-direct-
examination) from the witness, proceedings are video recorded, and later received at the 
subsequent trial (see Vulnerable Witnesses [Scotland] Act, 2004). 
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taking the oath, communication rules, introduction of evidence, and labelling or defining 
body parts, 2) anchoring prompts, defined as utterances providing children with external (not 
incident related) references (e.g., a holiday or a birthday, description of the location) in order 
to aid in the relative dating, timing, location, etc., of the investigated incident, and 3) rapport-
building prompts, defined as utterances designed to enhance the children’s trust and 
cooperation, and provide emotional support (e.g., by asking about the children’s family, 
friends, school, general knowledge, or neutral experienced events).  
Context: Substantive. Substantive utterances were defined as those designed to elicit 
information about what happened during the alleged incidents, what immediately preceded or 
followed the alleged incidents, within-incident events (e.g., unexpected interruptions 
exposing the abuse), witness details (e.g., witness intervention), other features of the abuse 
(e.g., how long the incidents lasted, where they happened), disclosure, and prior substantive 
formal questioning (e.g., what the child reported in forensic interview/s).  
Ground rule. The “don’t know/remember” ground rule (e.g., “If you don’t know it’s 
okay to say I don’t know”) and any practice or reiteration of the ground rule were coded.  
Uncertainty response type. Uncertain responses were exhaustively categorized into 
one of five main types: don’t know (including “not sure”), don’t remember, digressions (i.e., 
the child responded but was off task, resistant, or provided an irrelevant response to the target 
question), requests for clarification (e.g., “I didn’t understand. Can you repeat that?”), and 
non-responses. Each uncertain response was further classified in relation to how it was 
elicited: spontaneous, lawyer elicited, and in-answer. Definitions and examples of the three 
elicitation types are provided in Table 1. 
Reasoning. Reason offered by the children to explain why they were uncertain were 
categorized as: poor memory (e.g., “I can’t remember because it was so long ago”), being 
emotional/confused at the time of the incident (e.g., “I was really upset when it happened, so 
I just don’t know”), or being emotional/confused at the time of trial questioning (e.g., “This is 
really, really stressful for me, so I’m finding it hard to think back”).  
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Question type. Lawyers’ substantive utterances were categorized into one of four 
question type classes commonly used to differentiate between interviewer utterances in 
forensic interviews (e.g., Lamb, Hershkowitz, Orbach, & Esplin, 2008): invitations, 
directives, option-posing, and suggestive prompts (see Table 1). 
Question centrality. Questions that elicited uncertain responses were categorized 
with respect to whether the focus was on central or peripheral aspects of the incident under 
examination (see Table 1).  
Question content. The content of the questions that elicited uncertain responses was 
classified into one of six categories: suspect, victim, witness, contextual, disclosure, and prior 
formal questioning (see Table 1).  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Productivity. The number of new details conveyed by the child in each substantive 
response was tabulated using a procedure described by Lamb, Hershkowitz, Sternberg, 
Esplin, Hovav, Manor, and Yudilevitch (1996). Details were defined as the smallest units of 
information pertaining to the alleged incidents provided by the children. Details involved the 
naming, identification, or description of individuals, objects, events, places, actions, 
emotions, thoughts, and sensations relevant to alleged incidents, as well as any of their 
features (e.g., appearances, locations, times, durations, temporal orders, sounds, smells, and 
textures). Repeated words or details between and within utterances were counted only once 
unless the repetition appeared intentional (e.g., for emphasis). Details were only counted 
when they added to the understanding of the target incident(s), therefore false starts (e.g., “I – 
they went...”; “Um, well...”), statements that expressed the child’s present mental or 
emotional state (e.g., “I am scared”), phrases that suggested the level of confidence of the 
interviewee during the examination (e.g. “I know”; “I think”; “Maybe”), and claims of lack 
of knowledge/ignorance (e.g., “I don't know”; “I don't remember”) were not counted as 
substantive details. 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Overt emotion or confusion. Overt expressions of emotion or confusion that might 
also convey reluctance (e.g., “NO! I don’t want to go on”; “Why are you asking me this?”; 
[unintelligible shouting]), confusion (e.g., “I have no idea what you’re going on about.”; 
“Er…[no response]”), and distress (e.g., crying/shouting) were identified. Overt emotion or 
confusion was not necessarily coded at the question level because emotions and confusion 
could be evident during a number of turns. Each ‘episode’ was coded as one instance of overt 
emotion or confusion.    
Inter-rater Reliability  
Two raters independently coded 20% of the transcripts that were randomly selected. 
One-hundred percent reliability was achieved for the classification of non/substantive 
prompts, don’t know/remember ground rules, and children’s reasoning. Inter-rater reliability 
for the classification of uncertainty response type (both main and elicitation type) was high, K 
= .96 (SE = .01), 95% CI [.94, .98], as was the agreement when coding question types, K = 
.94 (SE = .02), 95% CI [.90, .98], question centrality, K = .89 (SE = .02), 95% CI [.85, .93], 
question content, K = .84 (SE = .03), 95% CI [.78, .90], productivity, K = .83 (SE = .06), 95% 
CI [.71, .95], and overt emotion or confusion, K = .74 (SE = .05), 95% CI [.64, .84]. 
Reliability was assessed throughout the coding process and all disagreements were resolved 
by discussion. 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
Discriminant function analyses revealed no significant effects due to gender or case 
verdicts on the proportion of uncertain response of each type, question types, question 
centrality, and question content. Therefore, gender and case verdicts were not included in any 
of the analyses reported below. Further discriminant functions analyses revealed no 
significant effects due to the different types of uncertain responses on the proportion of 
question types, rates of question centrality, and question content. The different types of 
uncertain responses were subsequently collapsed for inferential analyses.  
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Using proportional values controls for the number of questions asked by each lawyer 
and the number of responses per child and aids in the normalization of data distributions.  
Proportions were calculated by dividing the cell count of interest (e.g., the frequency of 
uncertain responses when prompted by defense lawyers’ substantive questions) by the 
appropriate grouping total (e.g., the total number of substantive questions asked by defense 
lawyers). All variables entered into parametric tests were normally distributed and alpha 
levels were adjusted to control for multiple comparisons. All parametric tests were conducted 
with child as the unit of analysis and power analyses confirmed that all inferential tests 
reported had enough power (set at 0.8) to detect at least medium-sized effects. Every analysis 
reported involved proportional values unless otherwise stated, with significant interactions 
followed-up using pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni corrections.  
Ground Rule 
Of the 56 children, 21 (37.50%) were told the don’t know/remember ground rule 
during questioning. Twelve of the 21 were told by prosecutors, 6 by defense lawyers, and 3 
by judges. In only 5 of the 21 cases was the ground rule reiterated later during testimony: 
twice by prosecutors and three times by the defense. All reiterations occurred after a break in 
proceedings. The don’t know/don’t remember ground rule was never practiced. 
Descriptively, children who were told the ground rule expressed more uncertainty in total (M 
= 94.05, SD = 86.32) and proportionally (M = .15, SD = .09) than children who were not told 
the ground rule (M = 65.97, SD = 67.51; M = .12, SD = .08, respectively). However, t-tests 
revealed that these differences were not significant, t(54) = 1.36, p = .18 and t(54) = 1.37, p = 
.17, respectively.  
Uncertain Response Frequency 
On average, 509.25 (SD = 320.79) questions were identified in each transcript, 
including 416.52 (SD = 250.86) substantive prompts, and 92.73 (SD = 95.36) non-substantive 
prompts. In total, 4,284 uncertain responses were identified. All children responded 
uncertainly, some very often (M = 76.50, SD = 75.60, range 9 – 375). Children responded 
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with uncertainty 15.02% of the time: 14.60% of the time (M = 61.41, SD = 55.11) in response 
to substantive questions, and 7.50% of the time in response to non-substantive questions (M = 
15.09, SD = 31.16). Due to their low frequency, uncertain responses to judges’ questions (n = 
119) were not considered further.  
Uncertain Response Types 
Of all uncertain responses, “don’t know” (n = 1,386, 32.35%) and “don’t remember” 
(n = 1,409, 32.89%) responses were most common. Non-responses (n = 704, 16.43%), 
digressions (n = 281, 6.56%), and requests for clarification (n = 504, 11.76%) were less 
common. Most uncertain responses were identified as spontaneous (n = 2,585, 60.34%), 
although lawyer-elicited “don’t know/remember” responses were also common (n = 993, 
23.18%). Children responded with in-answer uncertainty 16.48% of the time (n = 706).  
Reasoning 
Only 21 (37.50%) children explained why they were uncertain, providing only 64 
instances of reasoning. Children reasoned that they were unsure due to poor memory 
(70.31%; 16 children), being emotional/confused at the time of the incident (17.18%; 3 
children), and being emotional/confused at the time of questioning (12.50%; 6 children). 
Inspection of the descriptive frequencies revealed comparable rates of reasoning on the part 
of children in each age group (12 years old and under n = 6, 13 to 15 years old n = 8, 16 to 17 
years old n = 7). However, children in the middle and oldest age groups explained why they 
were uncertain most often (5- to 12- year olds n = 10, 13- to 15- year olds n = 28, 16- to 17- 
year olds n = 26). 
Lawyer Role  
A Repeated-Measures Analysis of Variance (RM-ANOVA) was conducted to 
investigate age differences (between-subjects factor: 12 years old and under, 13 to 15 years, 
16 to 17 years) in the proportions of uncertain responses elicited by prosecutors and defense 
lawyers (within-subjects repeated-measures) in each context (within-subjects repeated-
measures: non-substantive, substantive). There was a main effect for context, F(1, 53) = 
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37.75, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .42. Children were proportionally more likely to respond with 
uncertainty in the substantive contexts (M = .15, SD = .01) than in the non-substantive 
contexts (M = .07, SD = .01). There were no other significant effects.   
Question Type  
For the remaining analyses, only the 3,416 substantive questions and responses were 
analysed. A RM-ANOVA was conducted to investigate whether there were any effects of 
question type (within-subjects repeated-measures: invitations, directives, option-posing, and 
suggestive questions), lawyer role (within-subjects repeated-measures: prosecutors and 
defense lawyers), and children’s age (between-subjects factor: 12 years old and under, 13 to 
15 years, 16 to 17 years). Mauchly’s test of sphericity was violated, thus Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrections were applied (ε = .71 and .73). The results revealed a main effect for question 
type, F(2.13, 113.04) = 11.53, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .18. Proportionally, uncertain responses were 
more likely to be elicited by directive questions (M =.21, SD = .02) than invitations (M = .13, 
SD = .02). Directive questions were also more likely to elicit uncertain responses than option-
posing (M = .09, SD = .01) and suggestive questions (M = .16, SD = .02). Option-posing 
questions were less likely to elicit uncertain responses than suggestive questions. The RM-
ANOVA also revealed an interaction between question type and lawyer role, F(2.19, 115.96) 
= 7.95, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .13. Prosecutors were more likely than defense lawyers to elicit 
uncertain responses when prompting children with invitations, whereas defense lawyers were 
more likely than prosecutors to elicit uncertain responses when prompting children with 
directives. There were no differences between lawyer role and the frequency of uncertain 
response elicited in response to option-posing prompts and suggestive prompts (see Table 2). 
Third, an interaction between question type and children’s age, F(4.27, 113.04) = 2.34, p = 
.05, ηp
2
 = .08, emerged. Post-hoc simple effects analyses revealed that 13- to 15-year-old 
children were less likely than 16- to 17-year-olds to respond with uncertainty when 
answering invitations, option-posing, and suggestive prompts. When responding to 
invitations, children aged 13 to 15 years were also less likely to respond with uncertainty than 
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children aged 12 years and under. Children aged 12 years and under responded with 
uncertainty significantly less than 16 to 17 year olds in response to directive questions, and 
significantly more than 13 to 15 year olds in response to suggestive questions (see Table 3). 
There were no other significant differences.  
[Insert Tables 2 and 3 here] 
Question Centrality 
A RM-ANOVA was conducted to investigate effects of the centrality of question 
content (within-subjects repeated-measures: central, peripheral), lawyer role (within-subjects 
repeated-measures: prosecutors and defence lawyers), and children’s age (between-subjects 
factor: 12 years old and under, 13 to 15 years, 16 to 17 years). There were no significant main 
effects or interactions.  
Question Content 
A separate RM-ANOVA was conducted to investigate effects of question content 
(within-subjects repeated-measures: suspect, victim, witness, contextual, disclosure, prior 
formal questioning), lawyer role (within-subjects repeated-measures: prosecutors and defense 
lawyers), and children’s age (between-subjects factor: 12 years old and under, 13 to 15 years, 
16 to 17 years). Mauchly’s test of sphericity was violated, thus Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrections were applied (ε = .67). There was a main effect for question content, F(3.32, 
176.15) = 8.13, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .13. Children answered with uncertainty less often in response 
to questions about disclosure than to questions about any other content (see Table 4). There 
was also an interaction between lawyer role and children’s age, F(2, 53) = 3.34, p = .04, ηp
2
 = 
.11. Prosecutors elicited significantly less uncertainty when prompting children aged 13 to 15 
than children of any other age (see Table 5). There were no other main or interaction effects. 
[Insert Tables 4 and 5 here] 
Reluctance  
To investigate whether uncertainty was related to reluctance, the relationship among 
indications of uncertainty, children’s productivity, and expressions of overt emotion or 
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confusion was examined. A bivariate correlation, controlling for transcript length, revealed 
no significant relationship between the average number of new details elicited per child and 
the proportion of all responses which expressed uncertainty, r(56) = .19, p = .17.  
However, partial correlations, controlling for transcript length, revealed a significant 
relationship between uncertain response frequency and the number of overt expressions of 
resistance, r(53) = .62, p < .001, and confusion, r(53) = .34, p = .006. There was no 
significant relationship between the numbers of uncertain responses and of overt expressions 
of distress, r(53) = .20, p = .15.  
Discussion 
Many aspects of courtroom testimony are difficult for child witnesses. Children are 
often asked to recount complicated events that may have happened years ago in response to 
complex questions posed by opposing lawyers. Witnesses also experience immense pressure 
while under oath in a high-stakes environment. Because children’s testimony is often the 
most important piece of evidence in sexual abuse cases, the reliability of their accounts is of 
paramount importance and it is thus critical for child witnesses to indicate their uncertainty 
when appropriate in the courtroom. The present study was the first to investigate children's 
expressions of uncertainty when questioned by prosecutors and defense lawyers in court.  
Ground Rules 
The don’t know/remember ground rule was administered to 38% of the children in the 
present study and was sometimes reiterated when questioning resumed after a break.  
However, lawyers never practiced the use of the ground rule with the children, and so, as in 
Earhart et al.’s (2014) study, the presentation of the don’t know/remember ground rule was 
not associated with a significant increase in the frequency with which children expressed 
uncertainty. Further, children rarely explained why they were uncertain, perhaps because they 
were not prompted to do so. Since practice using the don’t know/remember ground rule prior 
to substantive questioning increases children’s propensity to express uncertainty when 
appropriate in experimental settings (Cordón, Saetermoe, & Goodman, 2005; Endres, 
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Poggenpohl, & Erben, 1999; Gee et al., 1999; Mulder & Vrij, 1996; Nesbitt & Markham, 
1999; Saywitz & Moan-Hardie, 1994; Waterman & Blades, 2011; see Brubacher, Poole, & 
Dickinson, 2015, for a review), more research is needed to investigate how preparatory 
procedures to help witnesses indicate uncertainty can be made more effective in the field. 
Moreover, in cases of adolescents and teenagers, the use of ground rules may be enhanced if 
there is a reassurance that normalizing the issue that lack of memory or knowledge may well 
be commonplace when one is asked about past events. This might help set adolescents and 
teenagers who fear appearing incompetent by saying “I don’t know” at greater ease and also 
alert the jury to the challenge of memory retrieval prior to substantive questioning. 
Overall Rate of Uncertainty 
Uncertain responses constituted a substantial minority of all responses (15%). 
Because many courtroom questions put to children were focused, complex, and about events 
often experienced long ago – it may be surprising that children expressed uncertainty as little 
as they did. Further, children expressed more uncertainty in response to substantive than to 
non-substantive prompts, and, contrary to prediction, overall there was no difference in the 
propensity to express uncertainty in response to prosecutors and defense lawyers. The 
greater-than-expected extent to which children expressed uncertainty in the courtroom may 
be explained by the context.   
Children testifying in court find themselves in a formal, high-pressure, high-stakes 
environment; the final stage of the investigative procedure in which they are under oath to tell 
the truth and a verdict with soon be reached. Furthermore, it is likely that child witnesses are 
brought to court because they are cooperative and have previously disclosed abuse. It thus 
follows that children might express uncertainty more in court (i.e., 15%) than in forensic 
interviews (between 6%, Earhart et al., 2014, and 12%, Hershkowitz et al., 2015) because 
questions in court are more likely to be option-posing or suggestive (Andrews et al., 2015), 
and to be linguistically complex or include legal jargon (e.g., Hanna et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, contrary to research examining child forensic interviews (Hershkowitz et al., 
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2015), more expressions of uncertainty were elicited by substantive than non-substantive 
questions, perhaps because the children were under greater pressure to respond accurately 
about issues of substance in court.  
It is unclear why, overall, children did not express more uncertainty in response to 
prosecutors than to defense lawyers, and further research is needed to elucidate this finding. 
However, it is possible that children are aware that defense lawyers are aiming to challenge 
the veracity of their testimony and/or may have been advised to express uncertainty when 
appropriate, particularly in response to defense questions. This, along with the high rates of 
closed-ended and suggestive questions asked by both prosecutors and defense lawyers 
(Andrews et al., 2015), and pressure to tell the truth, may partly explain the absence of 
differences related to the lawyers’ roles.  
Question Type 
We expected that the tendency to express uncertainty would vary depending on the 
question type. In line with our predictions, directives (e.g., “Where did you go?”) elicited 
more uncertain responses than other question types (e.g., “Did you go to the park or to 
school?”). These findings support experimental research suggesting that it is easier to guess 
in response to forced-choice/option-posing questions (which offer a possible response) than 
to recall-based questions (Gee et al., 1999; Waterman et al., 2000, 2004). More nuanced 
linguistic research is needed to understand why children responded to prosecution invitations 
with more uncertainty than defense invitations and to defense directive questions with more 
uncertainty than prosecutors’ directive questions.  
Since the extant literature was inconsistent, we made no predictions regarding age and 
children’s propensity to express uncertainty. However, age effects did emerge in the current 
study. Interestingly, overall, children aged 13 to 15 years old expressed less uncertainty than 
older and younger children, particularly when answering invitations and suggestive 
questions. It may be the case that adolescents are particularly defensive when responding to 
suggestive questions, and so are more likely than their counterparts to respond to suggestive 
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questions, even when they do not know the answer. Further, it might be the case that 
adolescents are more concerned than younger children about being perceived by jurors as 
credible witnesses (by appearing confident and mature), but may not understand the 
importance of expressing uncertainty when necessary. Such a tendency, combined with the 
lawyers’ likely tendency to overestimate the children’s cognitive and linguistic abilities 
(Hanna et al., 2012), may have increased the tendencies of these youths not  to indicate 
uncertainty when they should. Such findings highlight the need for more research to 
substantiate these speculations, as well as more research on older children in both 
experimental and field settings, where most researchers have focused on 3- to 13-year-olds 
(Earhart et al., 2014; Waterman et al., 2004).  
Lastly, it is notable that children of all ages were equally likely not to express 
uncertainty in response to recognition-based and other types of questions. Although the 
current field study was unable to consider the accuracy of responses, a plethora of research 
suggests that recognition-based closed-ended questions elicit less reliable and accurate 
responses from children than more recall-based open-ended questions do (see Lamb et al., 
2008, 2015). This finding therefore raises serious concerns as to whether enough is being 
done to provide children with the opportunity to give their best evidence in court.  
Question Centrality and Content 
 It was expected that peripheral details would be harder for children to remember (e.g., 
Peterson & Whalen, 2001), and that children would thus express more uncertainty when 
answering these questions. Contrary to prediction, children were no more likely to express 
uncertainty in response to questions prompting peripheral information than questions 
prompting central information. Perhaps when answering peripheral questions about 
emotionally salient and significant events in court, children do not find such details harder to 
remember than central details. However, it may also be the case that children felt pressure to 
respond to questions about peripheral content, perhaps because of the types of questions 
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being asked or the broader questioning context, and so children expressed less uncertainty 
than was otherwise appropriate.  
As predicted, children were more likely to express uncertainty when questioned by 
defense lawyers than by prosecutors. In particular, though contrary to prediction, children 
were more likely to express uncertainty in response to defense lawyers’ questions about 
central content, perhaps because the defense lawyers sought to discredit the witnesses’ 
accounts by challenging key aspects of their testimony. It was also interesting that uncertain 
responding occurred much less when children were asked about disclosure than about any 
other content. This may be because children’s disclosure processes were particularly 
emotionally salient and the children were thus more certain about what happened. More 
research is needed to elucidate why these patterns of responding might occur.  
Reluctance Measures 
 As in other research (Earhart et al., 2014), there was no significant relationship 
between the rates at which children expressed uncertainty and their productivity, suggesting 
that uncertainty was not related to children’s reluctance. This finding is further supported by 
the lack of relationship between uncertainty rates and overt expressions of distress. However, 
the present study found that the rates at which children expressed uncertainty were positively 
associated with overt expressions of resistance and confusion. Taken together, these findings 
suggest that there is likely a relationship between expressions of uncertainty and children’s 
reluctance, but that this relationship is much more nuanced than has previously been 
assumed.  
Since only a subset of reluctance measures were associated with uncertainty, 
uncertainty expressed in court may only sometimes reflect witness discomfort rather than a 
genuine lack of knowledge – and thus should not necessarily be deemed to reflect 
“reluctance”. This ambiguity calls for further examination of the circumstances in which 
uncertainty might reflect lack of knowledge or reluctance (e. g,, via laboratory research). 
Erroneously attributing uncertainty to reluctance may encourage questioners to push for 
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answers and increase the likelihood that children will both provide inaccurate responses and 
feel discomfort. Similarly, the ability to identify uncertain responses that reflect reluctance 
may allow questioners to offer appropriate support and avoid persistent questioning that may 
foster inaccurate responding and frustration. 
Conclusions and Implications 
There is currently very limited guidance on how lawyers should question children in 
court. The guidance that does exist is neither well embraced nor well informed (Spencer & 
Lamb, 2012). In the United Kingdom, it is now widely accepted that gathering evidence from 
young and vulnerable witnesses requires special care, and that subjecting them to traditional 
adversarial forms of examination and cross-examination is no longer acceptable (Evidence 
and Procedure Review Report [Section 2.1], Scottish Court Service, March, 2015; Spencer & 
Lamb, 2012). Evidence-based “Toolkits” (see Advocacy Training Council (ATC), 2011) 
have been introduced to provide continuing education and thus improve practice in England 
and Wales. Such toolkits should include empirically based recommendations to ensure that 
children understand the questions they are asked in court and feel comfortable expressing 
uncertainty. 
In particular, the findings of the current study found that most children were not told 
on the record that they could express uncertainty when they did not know the answer to the 
questions asked, and it is not clear whether such instruction would have affected their 
willingness to respond in this way. Importantly, most expressions of uncertainty seemed to be 
offered when the children were unable to answer easily (i.e., recall-based prompts rather than 
recognition-based prompts), underlining the risks associated with the use of option-posing 
questions that make it easy for children to respond even when unsure of the correct answer. 
Furthermore, 13- to 15-year-olds were less likely overall than younger or older children to 
express uncertainty, perhaps because they were especially motivated to appear competent. It 
is therefore recommended that children and adolescents of all ages should be told the don’t 
know/remember ground rule on record prior to substantive questioning. Lawyers should 
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practice the use of the don’t know/remember ground rule to check children’s understanding, 
and the ground rule should be reiterated throughout proceedings.  
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Table 1 
 
Coding Definitions and Examples 
 
Code Definition Example 
Elicitation 
type 
Spontaneous The child spontaneously responded with 
uncertainty.  
Lawyer: “What did he touch you with?” 
Child: “I can’t remember” 
 
Lawyer: “How did that feel?” 
Child: “Not sure” 
Lawyer elicitation The question contains reference to an 
expression of uncertainty, usually at the 
beginning or end of the question.  
Lawyer: “Do you remember what he touched 
you with?” 
Child: “No” 
 
Lawyer: “How did that feel? Do you know?” 
Child: “Not sure” 
In-answer Either spontaneous or lawyer elicited, but 
as well as expressing uncertainty, the child 
provides some substantive information. 
Lawyer: “Do you remember what he touched 
you with?” 
 
Child: “He touched my penis but I’m not sure 
what with.” 
 
Question 
type 
Invitation Open-ended, input-free utterances used to 
elicit free-recall responses from children. 
Such questions, statements, imperatives, or 
contextual cues do not restrict the child’s 
focus except in a general sense. Invitations 
can also follow-up on information just 
mentioned, or cue for additional free-recall 
elaboration about details previously 
mentioned.  
 
“Tell me everything that happened from the 
beginning to the end.”  
 
“Then what happened?”  
 
“Earlier you mentioned 
[person/object/action]. Tell me more about 
that.”  
 
“Tell me everything that happened 
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before/after you went to the park.” [when “I 
went to the park” was previously mentioned 
by the child]  
 
Directive Open-ended questions that refocus the 
child on aspects or details of the allegation 
that they have previously mentioned, 
mostly using WH- utterances to request 
further information.  
“Where were you when that happened?”  
 
“Who did that to you?” [when “that” was 
previously mentioned by the child]  
 
Option-posing Closed-ended questions that refocus the 
child’s attention on details of the allegation 
that they have not previously mentioned, 
although without implying an expected 
response. They can be formulated as 
“yes/no” or “choice” questions.  
“Did you see his penis?”  
 
“Was he wearing underwear?”  
 
“Did she do that one time or more than one 
time?”  
 
“Was this Thursday or Saturday evening?”  
 
Suggestive Statements or questions formulated in a 
way that communicates the expected 
response. They may introduce information 
not mentioned by the child but assumed by 
the lawyer or query the truthfulness of the 
child’s response.  
 
“He forced you to do that, didn’t he?”  
 
“Your dad told me that B. touched your 
private part. Did B. touch your private part?” 
  
Child: “He touched me.”  
Lawyer: “Did he touch your pee-pee over or 
under your clothes?” [when the child had not 
previously mentioned genital touching]  
 
“Did that really happen?”  
 
Centrality Central Questions that are plot-relevant, such as the “Who touched you?” 
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identification of main characters, the 
location and time of the incident, abusive 
actions. Changing any such central detail 
will change the plot of the incident 
described. 
 
“How did he take your clothes off?” 
 
“Were you positioned on the bed when he did 
this?” 
 
Peripheral Questions that are related to the incident, 
yet are not plot-relevant. Changing such 
details will not change the plot of the 
incident described. Examples include 
descriptions of people, descriptions of 
places, descriptions of time, emotions, 
thoughts.   
“How were you feeling when he did that?” 
 
“Can you describe how your bedroom was 
laid out at the time?” 
 
“Alan did this. Okay. Does Alan have a 
beard?” 
 
Content Suspect Focusing on the lawyer utterance, the 
specific content or information sought by 
the question is coded as suspect if it 
includes details regarding the suspect, 
suspect’s actions, suspect’s body parts, 
suspect’s verbal statements, suspect’s 
emotions or thoughts, or suspect’s sensory 
perceptions. As with all content codes, the 
information provided in response by the 
child may or may not be the information 
sought.  
“Who did that to you?” 
 
“Tell me about the man holding your arms.” 
 
“Tell me what you mean by his ‘wee-wee.’” 
 
“What did he say when he touched you?” 
Victim The specific content or information sought 
by the question is coded as victim if it 
includes details regarding the victim, 
victim’s actions, victim’s body parts, 
victim’s verbal statements, victim’s 
emotions or thoughts, or victim’s sensory 
perceptions. 
“You ran out of the room?” 
 
“Where did he touch you?” 
 
“Did you yell?” 
   
“Tell me how you were feeling.” 
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“Did you see anything?” 
 
Witness The specific content or information sought 
by the question is coded as witness if it 
includes details regarding the witness, 
witness’s actions, witness’s body parts, 
witness’s verbal statements, witness’s 
emotions or thoughts, or witness’s sensory 
perceptions. 
“Who was in the same room?” 
 
“Your brother was watching, wasn’t he?” 
 
“Tell me about what your brother said to the 
man.”   
 
“What did your brother see?” 
 
Contextual The specific content or information sought 
by the question is coded as contextual if it 
includes details regarding locations, time, 
and objects.  
“Where did the man sit?” 
 
“Tell me about the shelter where K. took 
you.” 
 
“What time of year was it?” 
 
“Did that happen one time or more than one 
time?” 
 
“Where did the Vaseline come from?” 
 
Disclosure The specific content or information sought 
by the question is coded as disclosure if it 
includes details regarding who the child 
disclosed to, the content of what was said 
during disclosure, when/where the 
disclosure occurred, the circumstances with 
which the disclosure occurred, the 
disclosure recipient’s reactions, and 
“Who did you tell?” 
 
“Did your mum get angry after you told?” 
 
“How did you feel when you told?” 
 
“What did you tell your mum?” 
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subsequent actions.  
Prior formal questioning The specific content or information sought 
by the question is coded as prior formal 
questioning if it includes details regarding 
what the child said to police officers/social 
workers/medical professionals at the scene, 
off-records, and during forensic interviews, 
as well as what the child said earlier in 
testimony.  
“Is that the same as what you said in your 
interview?” 
 
“Why is what is written in the interview 
transcript different from what you’re saying 
in court today?” 
 
“Officer D. told me that as you were leaving 
the room you turned to him and said you were 
making it up. Is that true?” 
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Table 2 
 
Proportions of Uncertain Responses by Question Type and Lawyer Role 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Question Type 
 Invitation Directive Option-posing Suggestive 
Lawyer Role M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Prosecutor .19 .03 .17 .01 .09 .01 .16 .02 
Defence .08 .03 .26 .03 .10 .01 .17 .02 
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Table 3 
 
Proportions of Uncertain Responses by Question Type and Children’s Age 
 
 Question Type 
 Invitation Directive Option-posing Suggestive 
Children’s Age M SD M SD M SD M SD 
12 and under .19 .05 .18 .03 .09 .02 .20 .03 
13 to 15 .05 .04 .21 .03 .07 .01 .12 .02 
16 to 17 .17 .05 .25 .03 .13 .02 .17 .03 
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Table 4 
 
Proportions of Uncertain Responses by Question Content 
 
Question Content N   Average n (SD) M SD 
 
Suspect 
 
56 
 
    
   67.64 (45.19) 
 
.16 
 
.02 
Victim 56    89.68 (85.07) .14 .02 
Witness 56    63.89 (40.86) .11 .01 
Contextual  56  123.41 (87.71) .14 .01 
Disclosure 50    13.34 (13.47) .06 .02 
Prior formal questioning 53    30.68 (32.56) .16 .02 
 
  
CHILDREN’S UNCERTAIN RESPONSES IN COURT 38 
Table 5 
 
Proportions of Uncertain Responses by Lawyer Role and Children’s Age 
 
 Lawyer Role 
 Prosecution Defense 
Children’s Age M SD M SD 
12 and under .14 .02 .13 .03 
13 to 15 .07 .02 .14 .03 
16 to 17 .14 .02 .15 .03 
 
 
